Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching by Goble, Dale
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Articles Faculty Works 
1992 
Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching 
Dale Goble 
University of Idaho, College of Law, gobled@uidaho.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, and the Animal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 101 (1992) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more 
information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Articles Faculty Works
1992
Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching
Dale D. Goble
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, and the Animal Law Commons
" OF WOLVES AND WELFARE RANCHING
Dale D. Goble*
I. INTRODUCTION
European cultures traditionally have viewed wolves as dark-
ness incarnate, the devil barely disguised. For the past 400 years,
Euro-Americans have sought to exterminate the beast. That cam-
paign has been so successful that the wolf is now listed as an
endangered species and protected by federal law. But efforts to
protect the wolf have been met by resistance from the western
livestock industry. The wolf represents a threat-both philosoph-
ically and economically-to the industry's entrenched subsidies.
In attempting to placate this politically powerful industry, the
agency charged with protecting the wolf has itself violated the
Endangered Species Act.
II. OUR HERITAGE
A. Killing Wolves and Saving Souls
Wolves engender passion. They are the beasts of fable and
fairytale: the wolf of Aesop, of Little Red Riding Hood, of Peter
and the Wolf, the wolf at the door. They are beasts of myth and
magic: Beowulf and werewolves and Fenris, who will devour
heaven and earth at the end of time. Human beings have long seen
something of the wolf in themselves and much of themselves in
the wolf: witness the wolf of the wolf whistle, of wolfing food, the
insatiable beast.'
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho. J.D., University of Oregon; A.B., Columbia
College. Part of the research used in this Article was prepared for a report by the Forest
Policy Analysis Group, University of Idaho: CARLA WISE, JEFFREY J. YEO, DALE GOBLE,
JAMES M. PEEK, & JAY O'LAUGHLIN, WOLF RECOVERY IN CENTRAL IDAHO (Feb. 1991).
My co-authors may disagree with the views expressed here, and they should not be held
accountable for them. Thanks to Don Baur for reality checks and to Carol Bradford for
poetry.
1. See BARRY H. LOPEZ, OF WOLVES AND MEN 203-77 (1978); JACK D. ZIPEs, THE
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF LITTLE RED RIDING HOOD (1983); cf. JIM HARRISON, WOLF
(1971).
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This was the image that Europeans brought with them to this
new world. It was an image expressed in a set of myths, myths
that reflected their history as herders, their religion's symbolic
glorification of sheep, and their fears of all things wild. This "hi-
dious [sic] and desolate wildernes [sic], full of wild beasts and
willd [sic] men ' 2 was a wildness they felt it their birthright and
manifest destiny to subdue. The Bible made it moral, their belief
in their own specialness made it natural.3
This special mission from God-this errand into the wilder-
ness-required the conversion of wild men and the cultivation of
wild lands if the new Americans were to achieve their destiny in
this new Eden.4 It required the domination of the wilderness and
the destruction of the wolf, that "beast of waste and desolation," 5
the ultimate symbol of wildness both in the wilderness and in
human psyches. It was the Christian thing to do, for the wolf was
the devil in disguise, 6 and the conquest of the wilderness was a
morality tale in which the European played the hero's role.
2. WILLIAM BRADFORD, HISTORY OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 96 (William T. Davis
ed., 1908) (written 1730-1748); cf. Luke 10:3 (Jesus' admonition: "Behold, I send you forth
as lambs among wolves"). As Roderick Nash has noted, the word "wilderness" etymolog-
ically signifies "the place of wild beasts." RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMER-
ICAN MIND 2 (3d ed. 1982).
3. As Robert Gray stated in a sermon in 1609:
The Lord hath given the earth to the children of men, yet ... is the greater
part of it possessed and wrongfully usurped by wild beasts, and unreasonable
creatures, or by brutish savages, which by reason of their godles [sic] igno-
rance, and blasphemous Idolatrie [sic], are worse then those beasts which are
of most wilde [sic] and savage nature.
ROBERT GRAY, A GOOD SPEED TO VIRGINIA (Wesley F. Craven ed., 1957) (1609), quoted
in Alden T. Vaughan, "Expulsion of the Salvages": English Policy and the Virginia Mas-
sacre of 1622, 35 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Ser.) 57, 61 (1978). Gray was, of course, merely
iterating Christian theology. After all, God gave man "dominion over.., all the earth and
over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth," Genesis 1:26, and commanded
him to "fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over... every living thing that
moves upon the earth," id. 1:28; see also Ecclesiastes 17:1-4; Genesis 9:2-3; Psalm 8:6-
8.
4. PERRY MILLER, Errand into the Wilderness, in ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS
1, 1 (1956); see also LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN (1964); HENRY N. SMITH,
VIRGIN LAND (1950).
5. 2 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WILDERNESS HUNTER 188 (Dakota ed. 1907).
6. E.g., JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST book IV, lines 181-87 (Merritt Y. Hughes
ed., Odyssey Press 1962) (S. Simmons 2d rev. ed. 1674). If not the devil, the wolf was
perhaps one of his trusted lieutenants: Horace Greeley thought of the wolves he encoun-
tered on his transcontinental journey as impudent "prairie lawyers." HORACE GREELEY,
AN OVERLAND JOURNEY FROM NEW YORK TO SAN FRANCISCO IN THE SUMMER OF 1859,
77 (Charles T. Duncan ed., 1964) (1st ed. 1860).
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The colonists in Virginia combined the tasks of conversion
and cultivation with admirable efficiency, offering the natives a
cow for every eight wolves they killed, thus "introducing among
them the idea of separate property" as a "step to civilizing them
and to making them Christians."'7 The Rhode Island government
introduced another attribute of civilization by requiring each In-
dian to pay a tax of two wolf skins.
8
If the natives objected or refused to conform to English no-
tions of proper civility, the "willd men" were treated as wild beasts,
as wolves. The frontier attitudes towards the two groups were the
game: the only good wolf or Indian was a dead one. A New
England preacher, for example, could rely upon the similarity to
justify the use of mastiffs to hunt Indians: "They act like wolves
and are to be dealt withal as wolves."9
Native Americans might not have found the simile inappro-
priate. To them, Wolf is a fellow spirit, the big brother of Coyote,
the trickster; he is a creator of the Earth and its inhabitants.' 0 In
Sioux he is shunkmanitu tanka, "the animal that looks like a dog
[but] is a powerful spirit."'"
B. Killing Wolves and Saving Cows
The European settlers and their descendents coupled their
fear of wildness-of which the wolf was both symbol and exam-
7. The Act of Mar. 10, 1655-1656, 1 Va. Stat. 393, 395. The statute was grandly
labeled a "Plan for civilizing the Indians by introducing among them the ide a of separate
property." Id. William Cronon has admirably demonstrated that conceptions of property
and ownership have a profound influence on how societies construct boundaries to their
ecologies. WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND (1983).
8. 1 SAMUEL G. ARNOLD, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PLYM-
OUTH PLANTATION 315 (New York, Providence, Preston & Rands 1859).
9. Letter from Solomon Stoddard to Joseph Dudley (Oct. 22, 1703), quoted in James
Axtell, The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness, 29 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Ser.) 335,
344 (1972). The similarity of attitudes towards wolves and Indians was pervasive. A Plym-
outh Colony statute of 1638 imposed a five shilling fine on "whoever shall shoot off a gun
on an unnecessary occasion, or at any game except at an Indian or a wolf." STANLEY P.
YOUNG, THE WOLF IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 76 (1946). Even when the natives were
not viewed as game, their kinship with wild animals was a common theme. For example,
Indians who "do but run over the grass" like "wild beasts" had no more claim to ownership
than did the beasts. Robert Cushman, Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawful-
ness of Removing Out of England into the Parts of America, in CHRONICLES OF THE
PILGRIM FATHERS 243 (Boston, Alexander Young 1841).
10. See LoPEz, supra note 1, at 102-34; Jeannette Ross, Indian Legends, in WOLF!
39 (Wolves in American Culture Committee ed., 1986).
11. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 110.
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ple-with the presumption that the government had a responsibil-
ity to kill wolves. Even when laissez-faire was the dominant eco-
nomic policy, protecting private property and removing barriers
to private economic activity were considered to be legitimate gov-
ernmental functions.12
Historically, a common example of governmental action in
support of private economic activity was the placing of a bounty
on the wolf. In 1630, Massachusetts Bay Colony offered the first
bounty: one penny per wolf.1 3 Despite continual problems with
fraud and the perverse incentive to protect a breeding stock for
the future, bounties were employed for over three centuries.1 4 The
fact that the practice survived for so long despite its shortcomings
suggests that this form of subsidy-encouraging private actions-
reinforced the prevailing laissez-faire myths of individual auton-
omy and self-reliance.
The second principal strategy has been direct government
action. William Penn hired a professional wolf hunter in 1705, and
the federal government still employs "Animal Damage Control
Specialists.' 5 Employing persons to kill wolves embodies a fun-
damentally different perception of the proper role of government
than does offering bounties to private persons. When the govern-
ment hires a hunter, killing wolves becomes a governmental ser-
vice like police and fire protection. 16
12. See, e.g., JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 6-8 (1956); see also DURWOOD L. ALLEN, OUR
WILDLIFE LEGACY 230-33 (rev. ed. 1962); Stanley A. Cain, Predator and Pest Control, in
WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 379, 379-80 (Howard P. Brokaw ed., 1978); George C. Coggins
& Parthenia B. Evans, Predator's Rights and American Wildlife Law, 24 AIuz. L. REV.
821, 826-27 (1982).
13. See 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN
NEW ENGLAND 81 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853); see also
STANLEY P. YOUNG & EDWARD A. GOLDMAN, THE WOLVES OF NORTH AMERICA 340
(1944).
14. See CRONON, supra note 7, at 132-34; THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE
LAW 32-34 (1980); YOUNG & GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 337-68. Alaska had a bounty
on wolves until 1984. ALASKA STAT. § 16.35.050 note (1990).
15. ALLEN, supra note 12, at 264; Cain, supra note 12, at 279-88; Michael Milstein,
Coyote Slaughter: A Federal Killing Machine Rolls On, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 28,
1991, at 1.
16. This approach is also more likely to eliminate the target species because of the
changed nature of the economic incentive: A bounty will lead to kills only as long as the
amount of bounty exceeds the costs of killing. A government hunter, on the other hand,
will be paid regardless of the number of predators killed and thus is more likely to kill the
last wolf. See Coggins & Evans, supra note 12, at 829.
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Until recently, there was a consensus that the public benefited
from ridding the world of wolves and other predators because
increased economic activity redounded to everyone's benefit. A
growing body of data, however, supports a different conclusion:
predator control programs are an economically inefficient subsidy
to the western livestock industry that, at best, produce mixed
ecological results. 17
C. Killing Wolves and Saving Wolves
The errand into the wilderness was pursued with religious zeal
and with Yankee ingenuity, with poisons and with steel traps. If
godliness is measured by success in exterminating wolves and
wilderness, the Euro-Americans have indeed been a godly people.
When Europeans arrived in North America, wolves could be found
from the Mexican Plateau near Mexico City to the islands of the
Canadian Arctic. 8 At present there are fewer than 2000 wolves in
the coterminous United States, scattered in small pockets of wild-
ness along the Canadian border.19
But success in taming wilderness and killing varmints gradu-
ally led to different visions of both wilderness and wolves. Wild-
ness became something to be cherished and preserved.20 Congress
responded by creating Yellowstone and other National Parks;2'
states established bag limits and hunting seasons.22 "Conservation"
became a rallying cry.23
17. For example, the size of a litter varies with population densities so that litter
size increases as wolf control measures increase. See L. DAVID MECH, THE WOLF 58-67
(1970); FREDERIC H. WAGNER, PREDATOR CONTROL AND THE SHEEP INDUSTRY 57-61
(1988). See generally Milstein, supra note 15, at 13.
18. MECH, supra note 17, at 31-36; YOUNG & GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 9.
19. Most of the remaining wolves are located in northern Minnesota, with a handful
in Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Washington, and Wisconsin. Carol Brady, Wolves May
Dance in Northwest Again, THE IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), Mar. 25, 1991, at IA. While
there is no accurate count of the number of wolves killed, this count must have numbered
in the millions: between 1883 and 1918 the carcasses of 80,730 wolves were turned in for
bounty in Montana alone. LOPEZ, supra note 1, at 183; see also YOUNG & GOLDMAN,
supra note 13, at 339-68.
20. See NASH, supra note 2.
21. See ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS (2d ed. 1987).
22. See THOMAS R. DUNLAP, SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE 8-17 (1988).
23. E.g., SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1959).
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Game laws, however, protected only "good" animals; conser-
vation did not include wolves or other predators. 24 Protection for
such beasts has been a relatively recent event. For example, while
non-threatening songbirds were protected by the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918, 25 predatory hawks were not protected under
the Act until 1972.26 As late as 1970, twenty states still had bounties
on wolves even though the species had been virtually extinct in
the coterminous United States for fifty years. 27 Even now, with
the gray wolf listed as an endangered species,28 the protection
remains tentative2 9 and schizophrenic. One federal statute author-
izes the extermination of wolves while another prohibits harming
or harassing them.30
The wolf remains a mythic category. Once the very essence
of lust, greed, and violence, it is now the latest emblem of envi-
ronmentalism-an "endangered species."
III. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A BRIEF OUTLINE
The decision to list the wolf as endangered under the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA")31 was a decision that the predator
control programs had been successful and the species was "in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range. ' 32 In enacting the ESA, Congress adopted a biological per-
24. See DUNLAP, supra note 22.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988).
26. See United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 493-94 (10th Cir. 1978); see also
George C. Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 165, 170-79 (1979).
27. DUNLAP, supra note 22, at 6 n.2.
28. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1990). In Minnesota the species is listed as threatened. Id.
29. The support for wolf reintroduction is, of course, less than unanimous. The
western livestock industry continues to oppose any protection for predators and is partic-
ularly vociferous in its opposition to wolves. See, e.g., Biologists, Ranchers Watch for
Wolves, THE IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), Apr. 9, 1990, at IC; Bert Lindler, Two Views of
the Wolf in Montana, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 16, 1990, at 12. Others continue to
present the wolf as a bloodthirsty demon, T.R. MADER, WOLF REINTRODUCTION IN THE
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1988), or urge control as
necessary to protect populations of "good" species, LESTER J. MCCANN, TIME TO CRY
WOLF! (1972).
30. Compare Animal Damage Control Act of 1931, 7 U.S.C. § 426 (1988) with
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
32. Id. § 1532(6) (definition of endangered species).
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spective that sought to protect not only plants and animals but
also "the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threat-
ened species depend. 3 3 Furthermore, it specifically sought to min-
imize the role played by economics. For example, the decision to
list a species such as the wolf is to be based "solely upon biological
criteria"-"economic considerations have no relevance to deter-
minations regarding the status of species." 34 As the Supreme Court
recognized, Congress intended to protect endangered species
"whatever the cost."35
The decision to list a species has three primary effects. First,
all "persons" are required to refrain from conduct that will "take"
a listed species. 36 Second, all federal agencies are to "insure" that
actions that they undertake or permit do not "jeopardize the con-
tinued existence" of a listed species. 37 Finally, in addition to this
duty to refrain from conduct that will harm a listed species, federal
agencies are under an affirmative obligation to take action to in-
crease the population of a species.
38
The most expansive obligation imposed by the ESA is the
duty imposed upon all "persons" to refrain from conduct that will
"take" a listed species. 39 The breadth of the prohibition stems from
the all-inclusive definitions of the two crucial terms. "Person" is
defined to include not only individuals, but all business and gov-
ernment entities;40 "take" is defined in "the broadest possible man-
ner to include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take'
or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife, ' 4 1 including conduct that
will "harass, [or] harm." 42 Indeed, the drafters intended the pro-
33. Id. § 1531(b).
34. H.R. REp. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2819, 2820; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (listing decision to be
made "solely on the basis of the best available scientific and commercial data available");
Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (decision "to
list a species [is to be] . . .based solely on an evaluation of the biological risks faced by
the species, to the exclusion of all other factors").
35. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (emphasis added);
see also id. at 172-74.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (C).
37. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
38. Id. §9 1531(c)(1), 1536(a)(1).
39. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (C).
40. Id. § 1532(13).
41. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2995.
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining "take"); see also Pala v. Hawaii Dep't of Land
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hibition to be broad enough to authorize the Secretary of the
Interior "to regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers
where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and
make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young. '43 In short,
the ESA does not require dead snail darters floating on the im-
poundment behind Tellico Dam-all that is required for the ESA
to reach agency and individual conduct is that the impoundment
will make it more difficult for snail darters to reproduce. 44
The taking prohibition is backed up with substantial civil and
criminal sanctions. A person who "knowingly" 45 takes an endan-
gered species is subject to criminal sanctions up to $50,000 and
one year in jail. 4 6 Civil penalties up to $25,000 may also be as-
sessed.47 Finally, a conviction can lead to the loss of all federal
licenses, leases, and hunting permits, and forfeiture of any equip-
ment involved in the violation.
48
In addition to the obligation to refrain from conduct that takes
a listed species, the Act imposes further duties on federal agencies
and their permittees. All agencies are required to evaluate the
effects of their proposed actions on listed species. 49 If the proposal
& Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1076-77 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir,
1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1990) (defining "harm" and "harass"). See generally Michael E.
Field, The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking Concept from Its Beginning to Its Culmination
in the Endangered Species Act, 21 Hous. L. REV. 457 (1984).
The Act does create one exception to the taking prohibition: the Secretary may
authorize an "incidental take" in conjunction with a federal project that is determined not
to jeopardize the continued existence of the species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(o)(2), 1539(a)(1)(B).
43. H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE'ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, at 140, 150 (1982).
44. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 165-66 n.16, 184-85 n.30
(1978); Palla, 649 F. Supp. at 1076 n.22.
45. The term "knowingly" does not require proof of specific intent to violate the
Act; all that is required is intentional conduct leading to the violation. United States v. St.
Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988) ("The critical issue is whether the act was
done knowingly, not whether the defendant recognized what he was shooting .... [T]hus,
defendant could only claim accident or mistake if he did not intend to discharge his firearm,
or the weapon malfunctioned, or similar circumstances occurred."); see also United States
v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-94 (S.D. Fla. 1987); H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 26 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9476.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1).
47. Id. § 1540(b)(1).
48. Id. § 1540(b)(2), (e)(4)(B). The Act recognizes few defenses. Penalties will not
be imposed if the violator proves that he "was acting to protect himself or herself, a member
of his or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm." Id. § 1540(a)(3), (b)(3).
Defense of property, however, does not preclude prosecution. See Christy v. Hodel, 857
F.2d 1324. 1329 n.4, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S.
1114 (1989).
49. Toward this end, the Act establishes a three-stage consultation process. 16
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will affect the species, the Act prohibits the proposed action unless
the agency can "insure" that it "is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence" of the species or "result in the destruction
or adverse modification" of its critical habitat.50 Thus, federal
agencies are prohibited from permitting or carrying out actions
that are likely to reduce the possibilities of survival and recovery
of a species "by reducing the reproduction, numbers or distribu-
tion" of the species. 51
In addition to the ESA's prohibitions against taking a listed
species or jeopardizing its continued existence, the Act also re-
flects a congressional recognition that merely refraining from harm-
ing a listed species is in itself insufficient. Accordingly, the Act
imposes additional, affirmative obligations on the federal govern-
ment. The broadest of these affirmative duties requires all federal
agencies to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes
of this Act by carrying out programs for the conservation" of listed
species.52 The magnitude of this obligation is revealed by the Act's
expansive definition of "conservation" as "the use of all methods
and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided
pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary. '53 Thus, all federal
agencies are obligated to take affirmative actions to increase pop-
ulations of listed species.
The third major obligation imposed by the ESA is the recovery
planning process. Congress recognized a need for a coordinated
recovery program. To this end, the Act requires the Secretary to
U.S.C. § 1536(b), (c). See generally Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763-64 (9th Cir.
1985) (discussing procedural requirements). Consultation is an ongoing procedural respon-
sibility. As a federal project develops over time, the agency must reinitiate formal consul-
tation if it receives new information suggesting that the action might jeopardize a listed
species. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). The Act also requires consideration of indirect or
secondary effects of the agency action. See, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews,
758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985); National Wildlife Fed. v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed., 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. at
153; Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb.
1978).
51. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990) (definition of "jeopardize").
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1); see also id. § 1531(c)(1) ("it is further declared to be the
policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve en-
dangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of
the purposes of this Act").
53. Id. § 1532(3); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973),
reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 3001, 3002.
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"develop and implement" recovery plans "for the conservation
and survival" of listed species.5 4 This requirement is intended to
insure that the Secretary takes the steps necessary to bring the
species to the point at which it may be removed from the list. 55
The ESA thus embodies a coherent statement of national
policy. Species facing extinction are to be listed as endangered or
threatened regardless of the economic consequences of the deci-
sion.56 A listed species is not only to be protected against conduct
that threatens its existence, but also is to be the beneficiary of a
program designed to restore its population. As the Supreme Court
has noted, the Act "reveals an explicit congressional decision to
require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national
policy of saving endangered species," a national policy that is
plainly intended "to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost.
'57
IV. THE WOLF RECOVERY PLAN
Despite the statutory requirement that the Secretary prepare
a recovery plan for listed species, fourteen years passed between
the listing of the gray wolf and the publication of the Northern
Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan ("Wolf Recovery Plan").
5 8
As finally written, the plan is to be "a 'road map' to the recovery
of the wolf in the Rocky Mountains. The primary goal is to remove
the Northern Rocky Mountain wolf from the endangered and
threatened species list."59 To achieve this goal, the Wolf Recovery
Plan establishes three areas in which recovery activities will be
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); see also H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9469; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9495 (discussion of requirements for
recovery plans).
55. See S. REP. No. 240, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1987), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700, 2709.
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
57. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 154, 184 (1978).
58. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NORTHERN ROCKY
MOUNTAIN WOLF RECOVERY PLAN (1987) [hereinafter WOLF RECOVERY PLAN] (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). The northern Rocky Mountain subspecies
of gray wolf was listed as endangered in 1973. Amendments to Lists of Endangered Fish
and Wildlife, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,678 (1973). The Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") in
conjunction with the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team published the Wolf
Recovery Plan in 1987.
59. WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, at v.
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undertaken: northwest Montana, central Idaho, and Yellowstone
National Park. It "emphasizes gray wolf recovery through natural
processes," such as dispersal southward from Canada into the
Montana and Idaho recovery areas. 60 Since natural recolonization
is unlikely in Yellowstone because of its isolation, the Wolf Re-
covery Plan proposes to actively transplant wolves into the area.
The transplanted wolves will be listed as an "experimental popu-
lation."' 61 This allows the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS")
greater flexibility in managing the animals because experimental
populations generally are treated as "threatened" rather than "en-
dangered," and thus are exempt from the automatic application of
the Act's taking prohibitions.
62
Noting that "an important factor limiting wolf recovery in the
Northern Rocky Mountains is human-induced mortality," FWS
proposes to kill wolves itself, thus demonstrating "to those con-
cerned about the impact of wolf recovery on the livestock industry
that responsible Federal agencies will act quickly to alleviate de-
predation problems. 63 This is to be accomplished through a con-
centric, three-zone management scheme within each recovery
area.64 Protection for wolves decreases as they move outward from
the core area, Zone I. Within Zone III any wolf "frequenting a
livestock area and representing a threat to livestock" may be "con-
trolled. '65 Since "control" is defined to include "live capturing and
relocating, holding in captivity, or killing the offending ani-
mal(s)," 66 a wolf loitering in the vicinity of livestock in Zone III
60. Id. at iv, v. The Wolf Recovery Plan's authors also specify criteria fojr reclassi-
fying the species. Reclassification will proceed through three stages. When at least 10
breeding pairs have survived in a specific recovery area for at least three years, the wolves
in that area will be listed as threatened rather than endangered. When at least 10 breeding
pairs have survived in each of two recovery areas for at least three years, the wolf will be
listed as threatened rather than endangered in the entire region. Finally, when at least 10
breeding pairs have survived for at least three years in all three areas, the species will be
entirely delisted. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at v. An "experimental population" is defined as any individual members of
a listed species introduced into areas outside their current range as well as the offspring of
these individuals. 16 U.S.C. § 1539G)(1) (1988).
62. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(C)(i). See generally H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2833-34 (discussing experimental
populations).
63. WOLF REcovERY PLAN, supra note 58, at 9.
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 33.
66. Id. at v (emphasis added). The authors of the Wolf Recovery Plan acknowledge
that the control program has two primary purposes: protection of the western livestock
industry and maintenance of large herds of big game species for hunters. Id. at 33.
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may be deemed a problem and killed. Even within Zone I, wolves
will be killed "if depredations on lawfully present domestic live-
stock occur" and other control methods are inappropriate.6 7
V. THE PERSISTENCE OF ECONOMICS
The authors of the Wolf Recovery Plan use an odd combina-
tion of language. Mixed in with descriptive statements on popu-
lation biology and habitat ecology are prescriptive statements of
moral censure.6 The language suggests a persistence of mythol-
ogy, a continuance of "wolf" as moral category in what was to be
a strictly biological document. 69 Yet closer examination reveals
that the morality is only a veneer. Wolves are no longer "bad" for
intrinsic reasons, they are "bad" because they may pose a risk to
the economic interests of beef and wool producers.
Economics rather than biology has become the driving force
of wolf recovery. The Plan's management strategies focus less on
the biological needs of the wolf than on the pecuniary desires of
the livestock industry. Placating the industry has produced a "re-
covery plan" in which endangered species will be killed to protect
the economic interests of ranchers. 70 Maintenance of the subsidies
enjoyed by beef and wool producers is the central political reality
of the Wolf Recovery Plan.
67. Id. at 33. The criteria for instituting control measures within Zone I are more
restrictive than those within Zone III. Nonetheless, the Agency specifically envisions
situations in which wolves will be killed in their core habitat.
68. Compare, e.g., id. app. 3 at 62-76 (appendix on wolf ecology and behavior) with,
e.g, id. at v, 33-36 (repeated references to "problem" wolves).
69. Robert Culbert & Robert Blair, Recovery Planning and Endangered Species,
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Aug. 1989, at 2, 3; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (statutory
requirements for recovery plans).
70. "Any wolf frequenting a livestock area [loitering] and representing a threat to
livestock as determined by authorized State or Federal personnel may be controlled."
WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, at 34. The program has already produced dead
wolves. Following reports of wolf depredations on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation east
of Glacier National Park in the spring of 1987, federal agents took control actions. By that
fall, four of the seven members of the pack had been killed and the others removed from
the wild. Peter Steinhart, A Wolf in the Eye, AUDUBON, Jan. 1988, at 79; George Wuerthner
& Mollie Matteson, Wolf Recovery Is Stopped Dead, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Nov. 23,
1987, at 10. But c.f. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (defense of
property is not defense to prosecution under ESA), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v. Lujan,
490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
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A. Biology Over Dollars: Congress's Choice
When it enacted the ESA, Congress endorsed a biological
perspective as a basis for the preservation of threatened and en-
dangered species: the Act was intended "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened
species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened spe-
cies. ' 71 The Act therefore required a species to be listed as endan-
gered or threatened on the basis of biological information 72 and
the accompanying congressional reports focused on "the need for
biological diversity." 73 In 1982, Congress reemphasized and
strengthened the biological basis of the Act by specifically pre-
cluding the Secretary from considering economic factors in the
listing decision. That decision, Congress stressed, is to be based
"solely upon biological criteria."74 As the Supreme Court has
stated, Congress intended to protect listed species "whatever the
Cost."
75
In contrast, the authors of the Wolf Recovery Plan accord
economics the dominant role. The criteria for selecting recovery
areas and for defining the boundaries of the three management
zones within each recovery area stress the potential confficts with
71. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 884, 885
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)); see also id. § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536) (requiring federal agencies to insure that actions do not "result in the destruction
or modification of habitat ... determined ... to be critical"). In 1978 Congress amended
the Act to require the Secretary to designate "critical habitat" for species at the time they
are listed as endangered or threatened. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-632, § 11, 92 Stat. 3751, 3764 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)).
72. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)).
73. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2990.
74. H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2819. The amendment was a result of the use of cost-benefit analyses
in the listing process by James Watt's Department of the Interior-a process that the
legislative history rejects in a lengthy statement that notes that the use of "any factor not
related to the biological status of the species" was precluded by the amendment. Id. at 20,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2820.
75. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (emphasis added);
see also Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835-36 (6th Cir. 1981) (lack of
discretion in listing decision precludes need to prepare environmental impact statement);
Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (listing decision
to be based solely on biology).
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other land uses rather than the species' biological requirements. 76
For example, the criteria for designating core wolf habitat (Zone
I) is stated in terms of land ownership and uses: less than ten
percent of the lands should be private, non-railroad lands and less
than twenty percent of the lands should be grazed by livestock. 77
While economics may be considered in the designation of critical
habitat,78 under the ESA economics remains secondary to biology
because areas may be excused from critical habitat only if the
Secretary determines that the exclusion will not result in the ex-
tinction of the species: biology thus is a limit on economics. 79 The
Wolf Recovery Plan, however, does not designate any critical
habitat. 80 Furthermore, its authors repeated emphasis on potential
social and economic impacts as the key decisional elements re-
verses the Act's requirement that biology limit economics. 8'
The dominance of economic considerations is also apparent
in the proposed wolf management strategies. Within each recovery
area, the Wolf Recovery Plan proposes a concentric, three-zone
management scheme with decreasing protection as wolves move
out of Zone I. For example, in Zone I, management decisions are
to "favor the needs of the wolf when wolves or wolf habitat needs
and other land-use values compete." 82 On the other hand, in the
buffer zone, when "wolf populations and/or habitat use and other
high-priority land uses are mutually exclusive, the other land uses
may prevail in management considerations. '83 Finally, in Zone III,
other land uses are controlling: habitat requirements and "coor-
76. For example, the WolfRecovery Plan defines Zone I in terms of "its low potential
for conflict with other land uses" and Zone III as "the area where wolf recovery will not
be promoted due to the high potentialfor conflict with existing land uses." WOLF RECOVERY
PLAN, supra note 58, at v (emphasis added); see also id. at 22, 31 (specifying economic
criteria as a basis for management zone determinations).
77. Id. at 31.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
79. Id.
80. The ESA requires compliance with the informal rulemaking provisions of section
4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988), to designate critical habitat.
The adoption of the Wolf Recovery Plan did not comply with the procedures required to
promulgate a rule. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
81. See WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, at v, 22, 31.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. Other high-priority uses are likely to prevail over wolf requirements, because
"[i]f wolf population and/or habitat use represents needs that are so great (necessary to
normal needs or survival of the species or a segment of its population) that they should
prevail in management considerations, then the area should be reclassified under Manage-
ment Zone I." Id. at 32-33.
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dination of multiple use activities with wolf management are not
management considerations." 4
It is difficult to square this management scheme with the
ESA's emphasis on biology and habitat protection. While the Act
includes a procedure for designating critical habitat,8 5 the Wolf
Recovery Plan was not formulated in compliance with that pro-
cedure.16 This is troubling since, as Congress recognized, conser-
vation of listed species requires the conservation of the ecosystems
upon which the species depend.87 The Plan's failings are, however,
more fundamnetal than simply a failure to designate critical habi-
tat: its repeated preference for economic intrests over the biolog-
ical needs of the species is directly contrary to the ESA's require-
ment that species be protected "whatever the cost."8 The
statutory goal is to establish and maintain a viable population of
wolves in the northern Rocky Mountains-not to insure that wolf
recovery does not affect other land uses. In fact, the ESA prohibits
other land uses that may take or jeopardize wolves.
The management strategies of the Wolf Recovery Plan reflect
FWS's apparent desire to placate the western livestock industry
which depends upon public land grazing and associated subsidies. 9
A consistent undertone in the Plan is the presumption that cattle
and sheep rather than wolves are the rightful users of the public
lands. This presumption forms the basis for the use of lethal control
measures: "wolves must be killed to protect lawfully present live-
stock." 9 Yet the fact that livestock is lawfully present is not the
84. Id. at 33.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3), (b)(6)(C). The Act defines "critical habitat" as the specific
areas which contain "those physical or biological features (1) essential to the conservation
of the species and (I) which may require special management consideration or protection."
Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
86. The Act requres critical habitat to be designated through the informal rulemaking
provisions of section 4 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(a)(3), (b)(6)(C).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
88. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
89. The Agency candidly acknowledges that the Wolf Recovery Plan seeks to placate
the livestock industry. See, e.g., WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, at 33 ("This plan
is to fully recognize the interests of... the western livestock industry."). The Wolf Recovery
Plan's authors also express concern for the interests of big game hunters, another powerful
economic and political interest: "If predation on big game herds is determined to be in
significant conflict with management objectives of a State wildlife agency, wolf control that
would not jeopardize recovery will be considered [in all zones]." Id. at vi; see also id. at
33.
90. Id. app. 8 at 117 (emphasis added).
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point. The Agency's statement blurs the distinction between a sale
of grass and the industry's desire for a predator-free environment.
This desire for a predator-free environment is a desire to shift
some of the costs of producing beef and wool to the public by
forcing the public to bear the cost of protecting the livestock. 9'
Since most ranchers simply turn their livestock loose on the public
lands, they avoid the costs associated with herding, fencing, or
otherwise protecting the animals. As Professor Rodgers has
pointed out, wolf damage "is merely another form of just loss not
unlike that inflicted by a wide variety of natural hazards. '92 In
other words, losses to predators, like losses to drought and dis-
ease, are among the risks the industry faces; they are costs of
doing business in the western environment. A homeowner has no
claim against the government when his house is destroyed by a
flood that the government could have prevented by damming a
river. Similarly, a rancher should have no claim if her cow is killed
by wolves. Self-help arguments are also inapposite: just as the
homeowner has no right to dam the river without federal authori-
zation, so the rancher has no inherent right to kill wolves to protect
her property.93 By requiring the federal government to remove or
kill "offending wolves," the Wolf Recovery Plan's "control" pro-
gram provides an additional subsidy to an already heavily subsi-
dized industry.9
4
The Wolf Recovery Plan also imposes other, less easily quan-
tifiable costs on the public. For example, the costs of the impaired
integrity of an ecosystem lacking predators are difficult to measure.
Similarly, the Plan completely disregards the value of wolf howls
and the knowledge that the animals are present; it ignores the
value of feeling "wildness." The fact that such environmental costs
are difficult to quantify does not mean they are not real.
91. Proposals, such as that by Defenders of Wildlife, to compensate ranchers for
losses caused by wolves are also attempts to shift production costs away from the produc-
ers. See Hank Fischer, Restoring the Wolf, FoREsT WATCH, May 1989, 21-23 (Defenders
of Wildlife compensation proposal). Such proposals also reinforce the basic presumption
that cows and sheep belong on the public lands while wolves do not.
92. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Building Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Re-
sources Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 213, 224 (1981).
93. Cf. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1428 n.8 (10th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (damage to property caused by wildlife is not compensable taking despite
governmental prohibition on killing wildlife), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
94. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT
CURRENT FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES Low (GAO/RCED-91-185BR) (1991); George
C. Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management
II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 71-75 (1982).
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The wolf control program is the clearest example of the dom-
inance that economics has achieved over biology in the Wolf Re-
covery Plan. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the Agency has
had a difficult time attempting to formulate a coherent, nonecon-
omic justification for its claimed authority to kill endangered
species.
B. Dollars Over Biology: The Agency's Choice
The ESA's principal prohibition is the requirement that all
"persons" 95-- including FWS-refrain from conduct that will
"take" an endangered species. 96 While FWS repeatedly empha-
sizes that its control program is designed to kill the minimum
number of wolves necessary to resolve conflicts with livestock,
big game herds, or other land uses, it is impossible to reconcile
any reliance on lethal control measures with the Act's flat prohib-
ition on the taking of an endangered species. FWS initially ac-
knowledged that the prohibition against taking an endangered spe-
cies prevented the killing of wolves. 97 The Agency subsequently
has reversed itself and attempted to justify the Wolf Recovery
Plan's reliance on lethal control of "problem" wolves.98
The Agency's first justification for its lethal control program
was based on the similar zone-management system in Minnesota. 99
This justification, however, ignores a crucial distinction: wolves in
95. "The term 'person' means an individual . . . or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
96. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (C). See generally supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
97. In a discussion of the wolf control program in Minnesota, the Wolf Recovery
Plan begins by noting that in 1974 "wolves in Minnesota were afforded complete protection
as an endangered species under the Act." WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, app. 4
at 88. At that time, the control program was limited to live-trapping wolves because the
"Service was prohibited by the Act from killing these wolves." Id. at 89. In 1978, the wolf
in Minnesota was reclassified from endangered to threatened and "[t]his rule... allowed
livestock-depredating wolves to be killed." Id.
98. The Agency has offered two attempted justifications for lethal control measures.
The first is contained in the Agency's statements on the comments that it received on the
proposed recovery plan. See id. app. 8 at 111. (The Agency's initial conclusion that it
lacked authority to kill endangered wolves is contained in the draft that was circulated for
comment. See id. app. 4 at 84.) The Agency's second justification is contained in an interim
control plan that it subsequently formulated. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF
THE INTERIOR, INTERIM WOLF CONTROL PLAN FOR NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAINS OF
MONTANA AND WYOMING (1988) [hereinafter WOLF CONTROL PLAN] (on fie with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
99. WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, at 88-90; see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(d)
(1990) (description of the Minnesota management system).
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Minnesota are listed as "threatened," while the Northern Rocky
Mountain population is listed as "endangered." 100 The different
status precludes similar treatment of the two populations. The
Secretary has discretion over the management of threatened spe-
cies that she lacks over endangered species. The taking prohibition
applies to endangered species by explicit statutory command; it
applies to threatened species only if the Secretary makes it appli-
cable by regulation. 101 Thus, while the ESA does not automatically
preclude killing "threatened" wolves in Minnesota, it does prohibit
such actions in the northern Rocky Mountains where the wolves
are "endangered."
The Agency nonetheless contends that it is authorized to kill
endangered species when it concludes that the taking is necessary
to control "specific 'problem' animals" to protect "lawfully present
livestock. ' 10 2 The Agency bases its assertion on its expertise and
the judicial deference that courts traditionally accord such exper-
tise, arguing that fears of a successful judicial challenge to a control
program "backed by sound biological information and built on a
sound administrative record are largely unfounded."10 3 Beyond
such generalities, however, the Agency's rationale amounts to little
more than repeated assurances that it has the authority it claims.
The lack of a persuasive argument is not surprising since the
Agency's previous attempts to authorize the killing of listed spe-
cies was rejected by the courts in Sierra Club v. Clark---and the
authority claimed in Sierra Club was even less expansive than that
asserted in the Wolf Recovery Plan.
Sierra Club was a challenge by conservationists to Secretary
of the Interior James Watt's attempt to establish a sport trapping
season for Minnesota's threatened population of wolves. The Sec-
retary sought to justify his proposal by relying upon the distinction
100. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1990).
101. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (taking prohibition) with id. § 1533(d) (dis-
cretion to adopt regulations prohibiting takings). While the Secretary of the Interior or the
Secretary of Commerce may forbid any act prohibited with respect to endangered species,
she is not required to do so. E.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discussing open hunting season on grizzly bears, a threatened species), cert. denied sub
nom. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
102. WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, app. 8 at 117-18. The Agency's "argu-
ment" is presented only indirectly in distinguishing the decision in Sierra Club v. Clark,
577 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985). The Agency does
not acknowledge the crucial distinction between endangered and threatened species. WOLF
RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, app. 8 at 117-18.
103. WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, app. 8 at 117.
104. 755 F.2d. at 611.
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between the statutory protection accorded endangered and threat-
ened species. The Secretary contended that denying him the dis-
cretion to implement the trapping plan "destroyed" this distinction:
The Secretary claims that while Congress imposed in 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1) a set of mandatory prohibitions regarding endan-
gered species, including the taking of such species, it sought
to protect threatened species by providing that "the Secretary
shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advis-
able to provide for the conservation of such species .... "
Thus, argues the Secretary, Congress granted him the discre-
tion to determine whether to impose section § 1538(a)(1) pro-
hibitions, including the prohibition on taking, for a threatened
species. 105
While acknowledging that the Act distinguishes between en-
dangered and threatened species, the court concluded that the
Secretary's discretion as to the latter was qualified by the require-
ment that the taking must further the "conservation" of the species.
The opinion stated that:
The plain language of the statute, including its definitional pro-
visions, compels us to agree with the district court "that before
the taking of a threatened animal can occur, a determination
must be made that population pressures within the animal's
ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved." Otherwise, such tak-
ing would not constitute an act of conservation under the Act
and would fall without the scope of authority granted to the
Secretary.I06
105. Id. at 612 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 613 (quoting Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. at 787). The section
authorizing the Secretary to adopt regulations to protect threatened species requires that
the regulations be "necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation" of the species.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). As the court correctly noted, "conservation" is defined as those
"methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered or threatened
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer
necessary." Id. § 1532(3). This may include, "in the extraordinary case where population
pressure within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, . . . regulated taking." Id.
The court's conclusion is supported by the legislative history which emphasizes that in
extreme circumstances, as where a given species exceeds the carrying capacity
of its particular ecosystem and where this pressure can be relieved in no other
feasible way, this "conservation" might include authority for carefully con-
trolled taking of surplus members of the species. To state that this possibility
exists, however, in no way is intended to suggest that this extreme situation is
likely to occur-it is just to say that the authority exists in the unlikely event
that it ever becomes needed.
H.RI CONF. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989. 3002.
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Accordingly, the court held that the Secretary's discretion to au-
thorize the taking of a threatened species was limited: the Secre-
tary cannot authorize the taking of a threatened species in the
absence of an "extraordinary" justification. 0 7 Therefore, it follows
that the Secretary's power to authorize the taking of an endan-
gered species is even more restricted, because the Secretary lacks
any discretion to determine which protections are applicable to
endangered species. 0 8 This conclusion led the court to reject the
Secretary's contention that the Act created a scheme "in which
'endangered species can be taken under strictly controlled circum-
stances only when their numbers exceed the carrying capacity of
their ecosystems' while 'threatened species can be taken pursuant
to regulatory measures which address the problems contributing
to the species' decline."' 09
Although acknowledging that the Act established different
levels of protection for threatened and endangered species, the
court rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the protection the
Act required. 1 0 It held.that while threatened species may be killed
only when justified by biological concerns, endangered species
may not be killed on even biological grounds."'
Thus, the court in Sierra Club rejected a position that ac-
corded the Agency even less discretion than it has claimed under
the Wolf Recovery Plan. In Sierra Club, the court rejected the
Agency's argument that it had the authority to kill an endangered
species when the population of the species exceeded its habitat's
107. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 613-14.
108. While all of the Act's taking prohibitions are applicable by their terms to
endangered species, only one of the prohibitions is automatically applicable to a threatened
species. The applicable prohibition is the violation of a regulation covering that species.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Compare id. § 1538(a)(1) (taking prohibition) with id.
§ 1533(d) (discretion to adopt regulations applicable to threatened species).
109. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 614.
110. In statutory terms, the Secretary argued that the definition of "conservation"
allows the taking of an endangered species and that this authority conditions the taking
prohibition in 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). The court rejected this contention: "The definition of
'conservation' in section 1532 does not nullify the provision of section 1538 that prohibits
the taking of an endangered species .... The Secretary simply ignores the language of the
Act and the statutory definitions that Congress adopted to give it force." Id. at 614-15.
111. Id. The restrictive interpretation of the Agency's discretion to authorize takings
of threatened species was recently reaffirmed by the District Court for the District of
Columbia in a decision enjoining Montana's grizzly bear hunting season. "Under the ESA,
the FWS can authorize a sport hunt of a threatened species such as the grizzly bear only
in the 'extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved."' Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Turner, 1991 WL 206232, at *3 (D.D.C.
Sept. 27, 1991) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)).
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carrying capacity.11 2 In the Wolf Recovery Plan, the Agency pre-
sumes that it is authorized to take an endangered species when it
concludes that the taking is necessary to control "specific 'prob-
lem' animals" to "protect 'lawfully present livestock.' 11 3 If the
inability of the habitat to support additional animals will not justify
the killing of an endangered species, the desires of the livestock
industry should not do so.
More recently, in its Interim Wolf Control Plan ("Wolf Control
Plan"), FWS has sought to buttress its claimed authority with an
argument based upon section 10 of the ESA.11 4 Section 10, which
contains a series of exceptions to the section 9 taking prohibition,
provides in part that "[t]he Secretary may permit . . .any act
otherwise prohibited by section 9 of this Act... to enhance the
propagation or survival of the affected species."115 Relying upon
this language, the Agency argues that killing wolves responsible
for livestock predation will enhance the survival of the species
because:
Removal of problem animals does more than stop the depre-
dation. It relieves the pressures or antagonisms directed toward
the total population by the landowner(s) incurring the losses or
other members of the public. Consequently, the local [wolf]
population is in less danger from potential nonselective illegal
attempts at damage control. 1
6
Killing "bad" wolves, in other words, will protect "good" wolves,
because people who are less adept at making the necessary
"moral" distinctions then will become less likely to kill all wolves.
In support of this argument, the Agency points to a footnote
in Sierra Club stating that the exception gives "the Secretary
discretion to permit removal of depredating animals or the culling
of diseased animals from a population."'1 7 The Agency, however,
once again ignores the distinction between "endangered" and
"threatened." The Minnesota case involved the management of a
112. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 614.
113. WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, app. 8 at 117-18.
114. WOLF CONTROL PLAN, supra note 98, at 4-5.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
116. WOLF CONTROL PLAN, supra note 98, at 5.
117. Id., supra note 98, at 4-5; see Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 at 614 n.8;
see also Brian B. O'Neill, The Law of Wolves, 18 ENVTL. L. 227 (1988) (describing
Minnesota program).
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population of threatened wolves. Reading the footnote to apply to
endangered species is inconsistent with the court's stringent inter-
pretation of the duty imposed on the Secretary to protect endan-
gered species: Sierra Club held that not even the need to relieve
population pressures sufficiently justifies killing endangered
species. 18
While neither the specific legislative history of section 10's
language'1 9 nor the history of the regulations implementing that
language120 provide much assistance, the Act's fundamental goal
118. Sierra Club-v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 614 (quoting Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp.
at 788).
119. Section 10(a), as originally enacted, provided that "[tihe Secretary may permit,
under such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, any act otherwise prohibited by
section 9 of this Act for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of
the affected species." Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 10(a), 87
Stat. 884, 896 (1973). This language was drafted in the Conference Committee to replace
language from the Senate bill which had authorized takings "[ulpon a finding that the
excepted conduct will not adversely affect the regenerative capacity of the involved species
in a significant portion of its range or habitat or otherwise affect the survival of the wild
population of such species." S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(a) (1973); see also H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989,
3001, 3006.
Section 10(a) was based upon § 3(c) of the Endangered Species Conservation Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1973). That section provided that:
The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he may pre-
scribe, the importation of any species or subspecies of fish or wildlife listed in
the Federal Register under this section for zoological, educational, and scien-
tific purposes, and for the propagation of such fish or wildlife in captivity for
preservation purposes, unless such importation is prohibited by any other
Federal law or regulation.
120. After initially republishing regulations adopted under § 3(c) of the Endangered
Species Conservation Act of 1969, 39 Fed. Reg. 1,444 (1974), the Agency acknowledged
that "[iut has recently become apparent that there are a number of conflicts between Part
17 [of the January 1974, regulations] and the Endangered Species Act of 1973." 40 Fed.
Reg. 21,977 (1975). Among the conflicts noted was that the regulations cover only the
importation of endangered species while the ESA "regulates many activities in addition to
importation." Id. Similarly, the ESA "does not authorize the importation of endangered
species for zoological and educational purposes." Id. at 21,978. The Agency, therefore,
proposed to amend the regulations to avoid
the misleading effect of the present section, by referring specifically to the
types of permits available under section 10(a) of the Act. That section author-
izes permits for scientific research, or for purposes which will enhance the
propogation [sic] or the survival of the species. This is a more restrictive permit
provision than under the previous act, which authorized permits for "zoologi-
cal" and "educational" purposes, as well as those described above.
Id. (emphasis added). To accomplish these goals, the Agency restructured the permit system
and tightened up the issuance criteria. See id. at 28,712, 28,717-18 (1975) (codified at 50
C.F.R. §§ 17.21, 17.22); id. at 44,412 (1975).
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of increasing the population of listed species so that they may be
removed from the Act's protection 2 1 compels a distinction be-
tween nonlethal takings such as trapping and relocating, on the
one hand, and lethal takings, on the other. This distinction finds
support in the Act, its general legislative history, the regulations,
and common sense. The ESA's definition of "conservation" draws
precisely this distinction: while trapping and relocating individual
animals are cited as normal management actions, killing individuals
is restricted to "the extraordinary case where population pressures
within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved.' 122 The
legislative history reinforces the point; it declares that the use of
lethal management techniques is an "extreme" and "unlikely sit-
uation.' 23 Finally, common sense points to the same conclusion:
The 1975 regulations envisioned an individualized process that would require a permit
for each action. In 1976 the Agency proposed to change this because "many scientific or
conservation programs, such as bird banding, require the repetitive handling and taking of
listed species over an extended period of time." 41 Fed. Reg. 10,912 (1976). As a result,
the Agency proposed "a flexible concept of permits in which one permit could authorize a
series of transactions over a period of time" so that an application would not be necessary
for each individual taking. Id. The rulemaking was finalized without change. Id. at 19,224
(1976) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (1990)). Subsequent amendments have
not significantly changed the provisions. See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,782 (1982); 50 Fed. Reg.
39,681 (1985).
The genesis of the regulations demonstrates that the Agency thought its authority
under § 10(a) was limited. Not only did it explicitly state this point, but the entire thrust
of the regulations-like the ESA itself-distinguishes between lethal and nonlethal takings.
See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(3)(iv) (1990) (taking of individual animal that constitutes "a
demonstrable ... threat to human safety ... may involve killing or injuring only if it has
not been reasonably possible to eliminate such threat by live-capturing and releasing the
specimen unharmed") (emphasis added); id. § 17.21(c)(5)(i) (state agency in state with
cooperative agreement not required to have permit for taking unless it is anticipated to
result in "death or permanent disabling of the specimen").
121. This goal is stated most succinctly in the Act's definition of"conserve" as "[tihe
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species to
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this [Act] are no longer necessary."
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1988).
122. Id. Furthermore, a narrow interpretation of § 10(a) is structurally consistent
with the ESA, which is characterized by broad prohibitions and narrow, well-defined
exceptions. The FWS's new interpretation of the population enhancement exception differs
markedly from this pattern. For example, the provisions allowing an exception for Alaskan
natives-which were the primary focus of the debate in 1973-specify in great detail when
a species may be taken, by whom it may be taken, the purposes for which it may be taken,
and the use to which it may be put. See id. § 1539(e). Other exceptions are similarly
restrictive. See, e.g., id. § 1539(f) (providing a narrow exception for existing sperm whale
oil and scrimshaw); id. § 1539(h) (providing a narrow exception for importation of antique
articles at least 100 years old). The specificity of these exceptions counsels against a broad
construction of the "survival enhancement" language.
123. The legislative history states that lethal takings are authorized only in
extreme situations, as where a given species exceeds the carrying capacity of
its particular ecosystem and where this pressure can be relieved in no other
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there is a difference between lethal and nonlethal control measures
when addressing species that are "in danger of extinction."' 2 4
Finally, even if section 10(a) does qualify the duty to conserve
by expanding the situations in which killing an endangered species
may be permitted, such killing remains inconsistent with the Act's
basic purpose of increasing the number of individuals to the point
at which the species may be delisted. As such, the justification
offered for lethal control must be strictly scrutinized. While re-
moval of sick animals from the population of an endangered spe-
cies may help conserve the species by removing a potential threat,
any conservation resulting from killing "offending" wolves arises
from preventing a fundamentally different threat, that is, the risk
to the species of illegal acts by humans. Yet the Act already seeks
to prevent that human threat by establishing penalties for such
illegal conduct. Nevertheless, the Agency seeks to turn the stat-
utory structure on its head: a threat to a species is remedied not
by prosecuting the persons posing the threat, but by the Agency
itself killing the animals.'2 At a minimum, the Agency should
explain why it does not rely upon enforcement of the ESA's stiff
criminal and civil sanctions to deter illegal killings.
The crucial point is that the Agency's new interpretation of
section 10(a) is inconsistent with the Secretary's fundamental duty
under the ESA-the duty to conserve.12 6 This duty necessarily
limits the Secretary's discretion. Reliance upon lethal control as a
primary management method is fundamentally inconsistent with
an Act premised on the prohibition of killing a listed species absent
an "extraordinary" situation. 2 7
feasible way; this 'conservation' might include the authority for carefully con-
trolled taking of surplus members of the species. This is not to state that this
extreme situation is likely to occur-it is just to say that the authority exists
in the unlikely event that it ever becomes needed.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 3002.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (definition of "endangered species").
125. FWS explicitly refers to this linkage, noting that "an important factor limiting
wolf recovery in the Northern Rocky Mountains is human-induced mortality," and proposes
to kill the wolves to demonstrate "to those concerned about the impact of wolf recovery
on the livestock industry that responsible federal agencies will act quickly to alleviate
depredation problems." WOLF RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 58, at 9.
126. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(3), 1536(a)(1).
127. Id. § 1532(3).
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VI. CONCLUSION: MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR ENDANGERED
SPECIES
The Agency's deference to the interests of welfare ranchers
is only one example of its lack of serious commitment to the
Endangered Species Act. FWS has never effectively enforced the
provisions of section 9.128 Indeed, the Wolf Control Plan proposes
to have the Agency kill wolves instead of prosecuting those who
do so. Moreover, the Agency has failed to provide legal listing,
and thus protection, for a significant number-between 600 and
3000-of biologically threatened or endangered species. 129 As a
result, at least twenty species of animals have become extinct
since 1980.130 One species actually became extinct notwithstanding
the fact that its only habitat was a wildlife refuge managed by
FWS.' 31 Similarly, the Agency has failed to implement recovery
plans 32 and routinely issues "no-jeopardy" opinions in the face of
declining populations.13
3
The litany of the Agency's failures could easily be extended-
and the problems are not restricted to FWS. The National Marine
Fisheries Service, 34 for example, has proposed listing the Snake
River Fall Chinook Salmon run as threatened rather than endan-
gered based upon promises of future actions by governmental
128. See, e.g., Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings
in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful
Species Preservation Law, 62 U. CoLO. L. REV. 109 (1991).
129. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR REPORT No.
90-98, AUDIT REPORT ON THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE 5 (1990).
130. Id. at 23.
131. See Final Rule to Delist the Dusky Seaside Sparrow and Remove Its Critical
Habitat Designation, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,112 (1990).
132. E.g., Harry R. Bader, Wolf Conservation: The Importance of Following Endan-
gered Species Recovery Plans, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 517 (1989).
133. The grizzly bear is the most obvious example. See, e.g., Diana F. Tomback,
Gold and Grizzlies: A Bad Combination, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Dec. 3, 1990, at 11; see
also Coggins & Evans, supra note 12, at 871-74; David Gaillard, Grizzly Recovery Plan:
Blueprint for Decline, GREATER YELLOWSTONE REPORT, Winter 1991, at 9; Keith J. Ham-
mer, Grizzlies at Risk, FOREST WATCH, Jan. 1991, at 12; cf. Fund for Animals, Inc. v.
Turner, 1991 WL 206232, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991) (FWS lacks sufficient data to
determine whether grizzly bear population is declining, stationary, or increasing).
134. The National Marine Fisheries Service has responsibility under the ESA for
commercially exploited species of migratory fish. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15).
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agencies and private economic interests-despite the fact that less
than 100 wild fish returned in 1990.135
These accumulating failures have become particularly appar-
ent during the Reagan-Bush, Watt-to-Lujan Department of the
Interior. None of the Secretaries have been strong defenders of
the Act. Indeed, many have questioned the need to protect every
endangered species. 136 Thus, the Wolf Recovery Plan's conclusion
that the Agency has the discretion to kill endangered species is
another example of an agency that has succumbed to political
expediency. As one court recently noted, there has been
a deliberate and systematic refusal by the Forest Service and
the FWS to comply with laws protecting wildlife. This is not
the doing of scientists, foresters, rangers, and others at the
working levels of these agencies; it reflects decisions made by
higher authorities in the executive branch of government.1
37
VII. EPILOGUE: RETURN OF THE WOLF
Since 1981 the gray wolf has been expanding into unoccupied
habitat in the northern Rockies. In that year a male wolf crossed
the border from Canada into Montana's North Fork drainage, the
western boundary of Glacier National Park. He subsequently was
joined by a female, and the pair had a litter of pups just north of
the border in the spring of 1982. A second pack established a
transboundary territory in Waterton-Glacier National Parks in
1984. The number of wolves increased and the pack split into
135. The Agency estimates that only 78 wild fall Chinook returned to the Snake
River in 1990. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Proposed Threatened Status for
Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,547, 29,549-50 (1991). Calculations of
run sizes before the arrival of Europeans vary between 928,000 and 2,391,000 fish. See
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON
AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (rev. draft Dec. 2, 1985). The
Service decided not to list the run as endangered "after taking into account those efforts
being made to protect the species." 56 Fed. Reg. at 29,550.
136. See, e.g., Warren E. Leary, Interior Secretary Questions Law on Endangered
Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1990, § 1, at 8 (Secretary Lujan quoted as saying, "Do we
have to save every subspecies? The red squirrel is the best example. Nobody's told me
the difference between a red squirrel, a black one or a brown one."); see also Interior
Official Chides Environmental "Nuts," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, § 1, at 6 (statement of
T.S. Ary, head of Bureau of Mines). See generally George C. Coggins & Doris K. Nagel,
"Nothing Beside Remains": The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of
the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473 (1990).
137. Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Evans, 1991 WL 155506, at *9 (W.D. Wash. May
23, 1991).
Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching
three, each producing a litter in the spring of 1987. One pack
established a territory on the eastern slopes of the Rocky Moun-
tains on the Blackfoot Indian Reservation adjacent to Glacier Park.
In May 1987 two wolves killed a cow and Animal Damage Control
personnel swung into action at the request of its owner. By that
fall, federal trappers had killed the dominant male and female as
well as two pups. 138 Private killings have also occurred. 139
Despite the illegal killing, three packs currently spend at least
part of the year in Montana: the Camas Pack in Glacier Park, the
Wigwam Pack located in southeastern British Columbia and the
Kootenai National Forest in northwest Montana, and the Ninemile
Pack in the Ninemile Valley northwest of Missoula.140 Wolf activity
has also increased in Idaho: in April two wolves killed an elk in
northern Idaho, and an injured female was captured in central
Idaho in August. 141
The gray wolf has not waited for the politicians-or the wild-
life biologists.
138. By that fall four of the seven members of the pack had been killed by Federal
Animal Damage Control agents. Steinhart, supra note 70, at 82; George Wuerthner, Wolves
Return to Montana, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 17, 1986, at 10; Wuerthner & Matteson,
supra note 70, at 22; see also Jon R. Luoma, New Approaches Bring Predators Back to
the Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1989, at Cl.
139. The dominant female of the Ninemile Pack was killed in late May 1990; her
mate was subsequently struck and killed by an automobile. Bill Loftus, Wolf Recovery:
Killing of Female Wolf in Montana Draws Outcry, LEWISTON (IDAHO) MORNING TIBUNE,
July 19, 1990, at El; Lilly Tuholske, Why the Saving of Six Orphan Wolf Pups Matters,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Dec. 3, 1990, at 6.
140. See Lindler, supra note 29; Tuholske, supra note 139.
141. Bill Miller, The Call of the Wild Comes Closer, THE IDAHO STATESMAN (BOIsE),
Aug. 3, 1991, at IA. The female subsequently died from injuries. Wolf Tracks at Site of
Elk Kill in North Idaho Elate Biologists, THE IDAHO STATESMAN (BoIsE), Apr. 2, 1991, at
1C.
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